DEISM

The Deism claims to be exact two things:

(1) That a god has created the cosmos and has not intervened in it since.
(2) That the existence of this God can be known through the mind.

The belief in a God for reasons of reason (2) stands in contrast to the understanding of God of the revelatory religions of the scriptures. In the narrower sense, deism can also be understood as a free-thinking flow of faith in the Age of Enlightenment.

The Eye of God is already known from ancient Egypt and later became synonymous with the Jewish-Christian God. Later it was mainly used in the environment of Deists.

1. Are there reasons for the belief in God?

1.1. introduction

The reasons for the loss of members of the major churches are manifold and by no means all who leave the church turn their backs on any religion. Many seek their salvation in alternative, non-institutionalized forms of Christianity, or in Far Eastern religions. Of course, representatives of the Christian doctrine, which demand reform within the Church, are in such a time of absolute boom. People should live their liberal spirit of the times within the church, and pastors should marry homosexuals and also marry themselves. The actually fundamental and philosophically relevant question remains completely unaffected by such criticism. It reads: Are there enough rational reasons to believe in the existence of God? This question is treated very negligently in the public discussion, also because faith in God is seen as a result of individual experiences, decisions or imprints, which is often to elude any rational discussion. However, this view is untrue. Faith in God can certainly be rationally founded, namely, if it is supported by good arguments in favor of the case. In fact, philosophers and theologians in Western history have tried again and again to produce such arguments, some of which must surely be considered outdated by now, while others still have a great power of persuasion for many people. In this thesis I will first examine the arguments still being discussed for and then common arguments against the rationality of God's acceptance. My underlying thesis here is that belief in God is not rational.

1.2. Definitions

Any discussion of arguments regarding the plausibility of the acceptance of God must first clarify what the word "God" should mean. In general, one can not meaningfully worry about the existence of any entity without initially having an idea of ​​what characterizes that entity. But that does not mean that in this definition of the concept all the properties attributed to the entity have to be considered, but it means that some characteristic properties have to be included in them, that is, some properties without which the entity is not considered as what unlike other entities, it can identify. How do we want to define the word "God" in this sense? This question is tricky, because countless views and definitions of the concept of God have evolved at various times in various places. For example, for the ancient Greeks the gods were beings like us, for the animists and pantheists the concept of God is synonymous with the concept of nature and some people in the 21st century see the term "God" as nothing more than an expression of their reverence for the universe. Notwithstanding this enormous semantic spread, I would like to start from the very concept of God that lies in the intersection of the great monotheistic world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). For this Abrahamic concept of God not only determines our social concept of God, he is also at the center of the discussion about God in Western philosophy. This essay will examine the arguments of occidental philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, Anselm of Canterbury, or Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and it is only logical to base this on the concept of Abrahamic God intended by these philosophers. This conception of God is finally characterized as the (1) only, (2) eternal, (3) personal, (4) disembodied, (5) unconditionally perfect being, (6) who created this world (7) and receives and directs. [2] Henceforth, arguments are presented that attempt to prove the existence of a being that combines one or a few of these qualities, and that will see God in that being. For example, the causal proof of God wants to prove a being that (6) created the world. And the teleological proof of God would like to prove the existence of a being that directs (7) the worldly destinies. Strictly speaking, a proof of God would have to prove that a being exists that has all the properties (1) to (7) to prove the existence of the Abrahamic God. But this is the only attempt on the ontological proof of God, and that only insofar as it is assumed that the property of being completely perfect (5) already implies all other qualities.

2. Proof of God

If the existence of God can be proved, then the rationality of God's acceptance is perfectly justified. Therefore, an investigation into the rationality of God's acceptance should begin with an examination of the most popular proofs of God. If only one of these proofs of God can convince, any further investigation would be superfluous.

2.1. The causal proof of God

The causal proof of God wants to prove the existence of God by invoking the causality principle:

        (P1) The causality principle is universal, i. everything has a cause.
        (P2) It does not make sense to assume an infinite recourse to causes.
        (C1) Consequently, there must have been a first cause, none itself
        Cause possessed.
        (C2) This first cause is God.

In short, the causal proof of God says: Because the causation of the universe was contingent, it must have descended from something that is necessary, that something is God. Although this argument of God is very often used in discussions about God, and intuitively seems very plausible, he is wrong both formally and in terms of content. For the following reasons:

(1) The premise (P1) is unfounded. We observe a finite number of event correlations and interpret them as cause-and-effect relationships. But just because B follows A does not make A the cause of B either. The assumption of a cause A is philosophically difficult, because it can never be said with complete certainty that an event A actually causally causes another event B, and not only occurs close to it spatially and temporally. Furthermore, the premise (P1) is most likely an inadmissible inductive closure, since the observation of finitely many (apparent) cause-and-effect relationships can not reasonably conclude that the principle of causality is always and everywhere valid. Even on the basis of one trillion committed cause-and-effect observations, no general laws can be formulated, because the one and only two-third observation could contradict this law.

Second, (P1) may not only be an induction but also a category error. We often assume that if all elements of a set have a particular property, then that property also applies to the set as a whole. If all things in the universe have a cause, then, so the implicit conviction behind (P1), the totality of all things - the universe itself - must have had a cause. We extrapolate the notion of cause, which has proved itself (in the macroscopic size range) within the universe, now suddenly on the universe as a whole system. At the same time we can not know if the idea of ​​causation makes any sense in relation to the universe, and quantum mechanics teaches us that the classically deterministic cause-and-effect scheme can disappear on other scales and yield to other (probabilistic-statistical) schemes. In addition, we know from many other areas that terms (such as "coat color") can be meaningfully applied to subcomponents of a system (such as "wildcat"), but at the same time make no sense in terms of the system itself ("the coat color of the biological species Wild cat ").

In physics, several models have been and are being discussed, in which the universe never had a first cause. Although the standard model of cosmology is based on a big bang that caused the universe, other models see it differently. The Big Bounce model of today's universe resulted from an earlier, collapsed ("Big Crunch") predecessor universe and expanded and subsequently contracted until it collapsed and gave birth to a new universe. The assumption that something has come out of nowhere at some point does not have to be made here and appears no less implausible than that of an everlasting cosmos.

Third, the assumption of the universal principle of causality (P1) also contradicts that of the often Christian-theological, colored libertarianism, according to which the human will is free and determinism is untrue. Thus, anyone who uses the universalistic principle of causality to justify an Abrahamic conception of God and the world, gets caught in a contradiction, claiming on the one hand the universality of the principle of causality (P1) and on the other the freedom of the human will (libertarianism).

(2) (P2) Consequently, (P2) is unfounded. If (P1) should be true, that is, if everything has a cause, it follows almost imperatively that there must be an infinite recourse to causes. Here we encounter, albeit in veiled form, the problem of ultimate reasoning. Every possible cause U1 can theoretically be questioned again: What is the cause of U1? If U2 is identified as the cause of U1, one can ask further questions: What is the cause of U2? Why is U3? etc. According to Hans Albert, there are only three ways in which this problem can be dealt with: (a.) Circumcision: U1 and U2 cause each other at some point. (b.) infinite regression: For each cause UX another cause is sought. (c.) Dogmasetzung: A cause U is accepted as "God given" and no further questioned.

None of these three options is really intellectually satisfying. Precisely for this reason there is no reason to exclude one of them from the outset rigorously, as is the case with (P2) with (b).

(3) The conclusion (C1) contradicts the premise (P1). If there was a first cause that was not self-caused (C1), then it can not be true at the same time that everything has a cause (P1). Either, everything has a cause (P1 is true), then the assumption of a Creator God merely shifts the problem back one place and it has to be asked what was causing God, or, there was a first cause, which itself was not Cause possessed. In this case, the big-bang theory, which is supported by many measurements (e.g., background radiation) and theories, is much more appropriate to act as a first cause than an empirically and otherwise undetectable creator god.

(4) Conclusion (C1) contradicts the premise (P2), in that an entity must exist forever in order not to be caused. This assumption is close and is additionally supported by (P1). But if God himself had to exist forever in order not to have been caused (C1), his existence would correspond to an infinite recourse of cause-and-effect relationships (contradiction to P2). On the other hand, it could be objected that the causality principle (cause-effect) can not be applied to God, but then the entire causal proof of God collapses, because if the causality principle can not be applied to God, then there would be no causal connection possible to God as the first cause of everything. In addition, hereby again (P1) would be injured.

(5) The premiss (P1) contradicts the premise (P2). If everything has a cause (P1), then one must land on an infinite regress (contradiction to P2). Thus, since the two premises of the argument are contradictory, the whole argument is invalidated, because it is well known that arbitrary conclusions can be drawn from contradictory premises.

(6) The conclusion (C1) contradicts the premise (P1). Either everything has a cause (P1), or there is a first cause which itself had no cause (C1). We had this contradiction already at point (3). Theists try to pick it up by claiming that everything needs a cause, but of course not the Lord God. But then the argument is tautological, for it reiterates that (P1 '): "Everything has a cause except God." In this case, God as an uncaused cause is already stuck in the premise, which means that one presupposes what one wants to prove. Thus, the argument says nothing more than modifies: "If God exists as an uncaused cause, then God exists as an uncaused cause."

(7) Conclusion (C2) follows neither from (P1), (P2), nor from (C1). Even if there must have been a first cause, it still does not follow that this first cause must have been God. The argument in no way makes it compelling, or even plausible, that God and not some other entity, such as the Big Bang, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster [3], has been the cause of everything. So even if one follows the whole argument up to and including (C1), then (C2), the ultimate proof of the existence of God, must still be ad hoc! Thus, the entire causal proof of God is useless.

(8) But we actually assume that the argument could convince as far as content and form. What would be then? Then, like any logical argument, it would still have to presuppose the validity of logic in order to prove God. For example, without rudimentary logical laws (in the following example, without the law of contradiction), it could well be that everything needs a cause, but there is no cause for everything. But if God, as the first cause, first created everything that has just been proved, then there must also have been a time when God existed but the logical laws were not yet created. But then the causal proof of God completely collapses, as he extrapolates logical laws to a time when they did not apply. But also. If the logic is assumed to be non-God-related, this relativises the causal proof of God, because then there is at least one that was not caused by God, and was already eternal, namely the logical laws themselves. How to turn it and the can In other words, causal proof of God does not in principle prove God as the cause of everything in other formulations.

(9) It is also doubtful that the use of the word "cause" in relation to a Creator God (C2) makes any sense. According to the Scottish philosopher David Hume, the following conditions, both necessary and sufficient, must be met in order to be able to classify a cause-and-effect relationship: (1) The cause lies temporally (immediately) before the effect. (2) The cause is spatially (immediately) adjacent to the effect. But if God first created the space-time continuum, and even exists outside of space and time, how could he have been the cause of the universe before, or next to it? Another proven condition is that: (3) The occurrence of the cause is always followed by the occurrence of the effect. This condition can not be proved, since the creation of the universe was a one-time process. Thus, none of the three conditions is fulfilled, but it would already be sufficient if only one of them were not given, in order to exclude God as in the classical word meaning "cause" of the universe. Of course, in another, more metaphysical sense, God could have been the cause of the universe, but then the argument confuses two causes, insofar as (P1) presumably refers to ordinary-earthly causes.

2.2. The teleological proof of God

The Teleological Proof of God goes like this:
       (P1) The universe knows (a) a locally life-friendly order and /
              or (b) some purpose.
       (P2) All ordered and / or purposeful entities have a smart designer.
       (C1) Consequently, there must be a smart designer who designed the universe.
       (C2) This designer is God.

(1) (P1a) is a trivial observation. A life-friendly environment is nothing special, but rather mandatory for every living being. Every living being must necessarily always find a life-friendly order for him, because if this were not the case, it could not exist (anthropic principle). That we humans find ourselves in an environment that seems to be exactly tuned to us, may be surprising, but is actually self-evident, considering that we have evolved in evolutionary adaptation to this environment. If completely different life forms evolved to adapt to a completely different environment, they would probably wonder as well, making their environment so viable for them. In addition, for example, string theory implies the existence of unimaginable 10 ^ 500 multiverses, where 10 ^ 380 of these universes are said to have a cosmological constant that is not significantly different from that in our universe. The fact that in some of these universes in some space-time sections the natural constants and other parameters are now such that a form of life can develop may not be so unlikely, it may even be a very common event and absolutely needs no explanation "Designer".


(2) (P1b) is untrue. According to the local and rational, naturalistic worldview, the universe has no purpose. One reason why many people nonetheless believe in it is a kind of expediency is their apparent fine-tuning of our way of life (see here point (1)). A weaker circumstance, which also makes us believe in the expediency of the universe, is certainly the use of intentional terms for the description of nature. Thus, in popular science books, we often read that the flowering of the bee's nectar, or that the earth "offers" us humans a life-friendly environment. The flower or the earth, however, does not really perform any conscious or purposive action, the use of the verb "to offer" here is nothing more than a rhetorical, slightly misleading stylistic device.


(3) The argument does not prove the existence of a first designer. For if (P2) is true, then the designer of the universe, or God, also needs a designer, since he himself represents a purposeful and probably also an ordered entity. The designer of God must then be designed again, etc., etc., - we end up again with the problem of "final justification". If a devotee of Intelligent Design now argues that God himself does not need a designer, he also admits that (P1) is untrue. Thus, there would be no need for a designer for ordered, purposeful entities, so the whole proof of God would be obsolete. Ultimately, the id-follower faces the following dilemma: (A) Either he claims that (P2) is true, then the argument is directed against God instead of proving it! (B) Or he assumes that ordered entities do not need a designer, but then God is not proven either, because then he no longer needs it to explain the order of the universe, then it does so through an innumerable number of empirical data supported standard model of cosmological evolution but at least as good!

(4) The teleological proof of God is circular, that is, presupposes what he wants to prove. Namely, that it can be recognized that the universe was conceived by a designer, aka God. This is particularly evident in the so-called watchmaker analogy: Imagine walking along a beach and discovering a clock there. Of course, one would assume that this was created by a watchmaker and not by natural, unconscious processes. But then we should first but rightly accept, so the clou of the argument that the universe was created, since this is obviously much more complex than the vile clock. This argument has many weaknesses, one of which is particularly blatant: if we follow it, then not only the clock, but also the beach and the entire universe have been designed. But how is the observer supposed to decode the clock or the universe as made when all his reference objects have been made as well? And even if we were to accept a non-manufactured and comparable reference object for the clock, which would contradict the clou of the argument, the analogy would still not go on: what in the watchmaker analogy corresponds to the unmanufactured "rest of the world "If the clock is to represent the entire artificial universe? Mind you, this something has to have a lot of overlap with a universe, by analogy you should be able to compare it to our universe (the clock) and make the conclusion that one was created and the other was not. Only: How many universes have the followers of Intelligent Design compared the universe to draw the conclusion of a design? You can only make such an inference by comparing the universe to a naturally occurring universe and identifying the sufficient characteristics for created universes. Since all this is currently impossible, the watchmaker analogy must fail.

(5) The conclusion of an intelligent design on an intelligent being is inadmissible. Let it be: (A) There exists an intelligent, creative watchmaker; (B) There are watches. Obviously, the following fact is true: AàB - if there is an intelligent watchmaker who makes watches, then watches exist. The argument, however, draws the opposite conclusion, first the existence of a clock mechanism is established, and then closed by an intelligent, creative watchmaker. However, this reversal is anything but unproblematic. Just because there are clocks or the cosmos, therefore, there does not have to be an intelligent watchmaker or the very concrete, Christian God. It could just as well be natural (natural laws) or supranaturalist, but unintelligent (pantheism) forces that direct our world.

(6) In fact, some theists argue that God guides the world through the laws of nature. This assumption has the positive side effect that it no longer makes the existence of "design flaws" so difficult to explain, since God is now acting through imperfect (evolutionary) mechanisms rather than directly on the world. But this is how everything can be explained, a God acting through internal systemic laws can be used to explain any system. And a hypothesis that can not be falsified by anything is also not to be taken seriously.

2.3. The ontological proof of God

The ontological proof of God appears in many garments. The best known formulation comes from the philosopher Anselm of Canterbury. He had presupposed that even a gate understood the expression "a being beyond which nothing greater can be thought". From this mere concept of a "greatest being," Anselm concluded the existence of God:

       (P1) Man has the belief in a greatest being beyond which nothing greater can be thought.
       (P2) An entity that is not only in the minds of people, but also in
              Reality exists is greater than a merely imagined entity.
       (C1) So there exists the essence beyond which nothing greater can be thought.
       (C2) And this being is the Christian God.

There are various formulations of the ontological proof of God's existence, all endeavoring to prove the existence of God a priori (purely out of thought), and without the addition of empiricism. The adjectives "big" and "perfect" are often used meaningfully. In Anselm's version, the imaginary perfect being, or God, necessarily exists, since perfection necessarily implies existence. One of the reasons why this argument has been included in intellectual history is that many intuitively realize that something is wrong with it, but at first can not say exactly what the mistake is.

(1) The monk Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, a contemporary of Anselm, but found a very simple counterargument: If Anselms proof were correct, we could in the same way also prove the existence of an island, which we define as the highest perfectly, after all (P2) the actual existence is an essential element of its absolute perfection. This conclusion shows that if the second premise were true, we could prove with it that every imaginary, defined, or believed perfect entity as well as existent existent. The assumption of the existence of all conceivable perfect entities is not only intuitively absurd, but also violates Ockham's proven principle of economy. Therefore, it should be rejected along with the (P2).

(2) Defining an object means supplying to it those predicates which the object has to fulfill. However, existence itself is not a predicate, but rather a predicate of predicates, that is, a property of properties. Therefore, from a definition, even from the definition of God, we can only learn what properties the defined must have, if it exists, but not that it exists. Existence does not belong to the essence of a thing and must be independently determined empirically. Or, to put it another way: when a defined entity is found in reality, its existence results from its definition, but it is not, conversely, part of the definition. In relation to a fully-conceived being, this means that while we may conceive of the same as perfect, it in no way implies that in fact there actually exists something that corresponds to that idea.

(3) The ontological proof of God not only does not speak for the existence of the Christian God, in a sense he even speaks against it! Moreover, if the ontological proof of God would do justice to his claim, he would prove the non-existence of the Christian God as the highest of all beings. The first thing to realize is that I can easily imagine a being greater than the Christian God, but I only have to imagine one being, which by definition is twice as perfect as the Christian God. I can also imagine more plastically that a duplicate to the Christian God exists, but which did not have to rest on the seventh day of creation, or had not sacrificed his son for forgiveness of sins and in that sense is more almighty and thus ultimately more perfect than the Christian God. Whether the Christian God exists or not, he is no longer the most perfect of all beings, since the new greatest of all imaginary beings (P2) must actually exist and transcend the Christian God in its perfection. Consequently, Anselm's argument, even if it could convince up to and including (C1), would have proved the opposite of what he intends to do (namely, C2), namely, the non-existence of the Christian God as the highest of all beings!

2.4. Pascal's bet

The philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal finds an extraordinary argument for the usefulness of the belief in God, which can be summarized in the following table:

                                    A1: God exists            A2: God does not exist

B1: Faith in God       :               + ∞ (heaven)                 0
B2: No faith in God :               -∞ (hell)                          0

Formulated "Pascals bet" is:

       (P1) Either one chooses to believe in God (B1) or against (B2).
       (P2) Either God exists (A1), or God does not exist (A2).
       (P3) If (A1) and (B1), one gets into the eternal sky, that means an infinite advantage over (A1) and (B2).
       (P4) If (A1) and (B2), you land in eternal hell, that means one
              infinite disadvantage over (A1) and (B1).
       (P5) But if (A2), you lose nothing, irrelevant if (B1) or (B2).
       (K) From (P1) to (P5) it follows: Faith in God can not be detrimental and is at best of infinite advantage, therefore it is the pragmatically best option.

Clearly, Pascal is leaving the territory of rational reasoning that we have been investigating, for he does not provide an argument for or against the existence of God! Instead, he chooses a pragmatic approach and argues for the individual rationality of believing in the existence of God. However, his argument can not be convincing for the following reasons:

(1) (P1) is untrue. Pascal assumes here that one could decide for or against a belief because of pragmatic considerations, but a belief is not a will decision. Even with all my willpower, for example, I can not believe that Santa Claus exists, as I know too good reasons against his existence. Many people are like God, they can not believe in their existence, even if they want it. The Theists often argue that these people should put their rational reasons and arguments behind them and listen more to their "feelings", then they could already believe what they want, nor solve the problem. For it is not possible, either with the intellect or with the feeling, to believe in two contradictory things at the same time. If you hear the statement, "This bullet here is completely white and completely black at the same time," and they want to believe that with all their heart, then it will not work! You can believe in miracles, but not in contradictions. Similar to the black-and-white sphere, the Christian God targeted by Pascal is already characterized in a contradictory way. So he is supposed to be omniscient, that is, he also knows that at the future time t the event x will occur. On the other hand, the Christian God should also be omnipotent, according to which he would have to be able to prevent the event x from occurring at the future time t. The properties of omniscience and omnipotence, equally attributed to the Christian God, contradict each other. Once you have internalized and thought through this, you can not simply believe in the Christian God, neither rationally nor emotionally, he can not even imagine him, even if he wants to. For man can not believe what he wants.

(2) (P2) is untrue. The premise (P2) and therefore the bet would only be valid if - as Pascal supposed - it either gave the Catholic God or not. Of course, there may be other gods, such as Odin or Allah. Since you theoretically have infinitely many images of God to choose from, the probability of catching the right one is infinitely low.

(3) So also (P3) and (P4) are untrue. If there are potentially infinitely many gods imaginable, you have endless possibilities to be wrong. Anyone who convinces them of Pascal's bet and believes in the Christian God could be badly surprised on the last day, when he suddenly stands at the gates of Odin. Perhaps the truly existent God also selects on completely different criteria than faith and unbelief. For example, the philosopher John Leslie Mackie considered it possible that a divine being might be more well-disposed to an atheist at the recent tribunal than to a man who believed in him solely because of the arguments put forward by Pascal. It seems, at least intuitively obvious, that a perfect being would value other qualities such as helpfulness, curiosity, or tolerance more than beliefs based on accidental circumstances such as place of birth and early childhood indoctrination, and nothing about the character of a person. Who knows, maybe God will even take it on people, even if they have called themselves only because of selfish considerations of value and not out of conviction his followers? An infinite number of such scenarios seem possible, and (P3) and (P4) are anything but necessary.

But how should one behave from a pragmatic point of view in view of this infinite number of possibilities? A counter bet on Pascal's wager might look like this:

It is in any case appropriate not to believe in God out of self-interest and to always try to make this world a better place. If there is no God, one has lost nothing and will always be remembered by men. And if there is a good God, he will judge man by his deeds and not by whether he happened to believe in him or not. In this case, too, it makes sense to lead a good life. No one can arm himself against a bad god.

(4) The last premise (P5) suppresses any opportunity costs in this world. Depending on how the belief in God already influences my earthly life, I lose or win through this one. For example, if my faith requires me to pray five times a day, I would rather play soccer during that time, I lose faith in quality of life. Regardless of whether God or not.

3.1. Wonder

A miracle (A) is in contradiction to the laws of nature and (B) can therefore be understood as a direct intervention of God in world affairs.

How can one argue against the credibility of miracle claims? Some fundamental naturalists already deny that it can even give an event (A) that contradicts the laws of nature. If we observe something that apparently contradicts a law of nature, then either something has not been agreed with our observation or the alleged natural law has been falsified and has to be replaced by a new, better one. However, there is no way in this frame of mind where an observation could point to a "miracle" or a "god." He therefore has on closer inspection also little for himself. For he excludes miracles a priori by setting naturalism as a dogma. But in principle, it does not do any good for a rational discussion to exclude anything from the beginning, so it does not make sense to understand natural laws in such a way that they simply describe the course of nature, because then we would not recognize miracles, even if they were before ours Nose would happen. Rather, we should understand a law of nature as describing the course of nature, insofar as no supranatural intervention takes place in nature. In this way, the existence of miracles is not excluded from the outset and therefore can now be reasonably checked.

In keeping with this definition, David Hume also argued against the assumption of miracles. Hume did not brush aside miraculous assertions as unconstitutional laws of nature, claiming they would lose their credibility against the background of probabilistic considerations.

At the beginning of his reasoning, he asks why we assume that a testified event that is in contradiction to the laws of nature has actually taken place. If there are no credible sources for a miracle, then the miracle argument for the existence of God is done with it, without the need for further reflection. But when would it be generally reasonable to believe in a man's account of a miracle he perceived? According to Hume, this is only the case if the man has neither deceived himself nor wants to deceive his fellow man. (P1) The more rigorously these two deceptions can be excluded, the sooner we are prepared to believe that the testified event is indeed a miracle. (P2) Furthermore, it should be clear to anyone that the less likely the testified event is, the more credible the witness must be to accept his report as true. It follows that an eyewitness account should be believed only if the witness's credibility is even less likely than the reality of the reported event. However, since a miracle is an extremely unlikely event, its occurrence in reality is not impossible in principle, but the witness must already be enormously credible, so that a deception on his part is even less likely than the miracle itself.

"No testimony is sufficient to confirm a miracle unless the testimony is of the kind that its falseness would be a greater miracle than the event that is to confirm the testimony [...] I weigh one miracle against the other and decide in the end always against the greater miracle. "David Hume

3.2. Personal revelations

A "personal revelation of God" should be understood as an experience with God that does not violate natural laws and therefore is not given out as a "miracle". This category includes religious near-death experiences, (day) dreams of God, prayers, ascetic experiences of God, and ordinary experiences of God, of which people occasionally report. These revelations do not necessarily violate laws of nature and could be considered more likely to be a miracle in this sense. Nevertheless, the question arises to what extent revelatory experiences, however credible they might feel as a subjective experience for an individual, are sufficient evidence for their or God's objective reality. There are innumerable hallucinations, treachery and cognitive distortions known from cognitive science and psychology, which make it more likely that the individual has been wrong than that he really did have a divine revelation. To this is added the circumstance that the almighty God, according to the general Christian conception, wishes to reveal himself to all men. But if there is a God who is omnipotent and who wants to make himself known to all people, then inevitably everyone would know him. But since obviously not the same God has revealed himself to all human beings, but there are innumerable ideas of God and a growing number of atheists worldwide, the reference to individual revelations is not an argument for, but much more against the existence of the Christian God. And this argument becomes all the more powerful, considering that it is still valid, even if one believes that God could not be proved rationally, but could only be experienced through personal revelation. If there really were such a God who would reveal Himself to all who seek Him, then all men would find the same God. But that Iranians in their God search mostly Allah, Indian Brahma and Israelis Yahweh, is one of the strongest arguments against an almighty God, who wants to reveal himself to all seekers alike.

4. Arguments against the existence of God

So far it has been shown that it is not rational to believe in God because there are no rational arguments for its existence. It must be made clear here that the epistemic goal is thus fulfilled: The burden of proof in an argument always lies with the assertor, that is, the one who asserts the existence of X, and not the one who doubts or denies the existence of X, stands in the duty to make arguments for his position. Thus, by invalidating the most common arguments for the existence of God, the duty was already done, the weak atheism, that is, the non-belief in God, was established, or, de Deism, the belief in the rationality of the belief in God, was warded off. The belief in God is non-rational, this can already be stated. But is he also irrational? This would be the case if there were not only no arguments for, but also good arguments against the existence of God. That this is indeed the case, and that belief in God is irrational even because it is opposed to good rational arguments, will be shown in the following sections. In doing so, a new, argumentative point of view is explicitly entered: While so far the deducibility of God from the world (on the basis of criticism of the proofs of God and revelation doctrines) has been denied, from now on the mere compatibility of the existence of God with the world is argued. If this were to succeed convincingly, then the strong atheism, which believes in the non-existence of God, would be justified in addition. The theist, who takes the opposite position and asserts the existence of God, meanwhile finds himself in an even greater trouble than had previously appeared. For he now also has to contend with the contra arguments and must point out the derivability of the existence (of an all-benevolent and almighty) God from a world decomposed by evil, unfulfilled prayers and so on. As we shall see shortly, this is simply impossible.

4.1. Theodicy

The theodicy problem is that the Christian God should actually have omnipotence (omnipotence) and will (all-goodness) to prevent suffering in the world, but obviously still suffering in the world. In my opinion, it can best be formalized as follows:

      (P1) God is the summum bonum, the highest good, that means in particular:
         (P1a) God is all-good, that is, he wants to realize the best.
         (P1b) God is omnipotent, that is, he can realize everything he wants.
         (P1c) God is omniscient, that also means he knows what the best he can do is realize it.
___________________
         (K) God has realized the best possible, that is, in particular, he has realized the best possible world.

However:

(B): There is suffering in the world.

The theodicy problem consists in the fact that evidently not simultaneously the conclusion (K) and the observation sentence (B) can be asserted without becoming entangled in a contradiction. Various theodicy ("attempts to justify God") try to lift this contradiction. This is done either by a theodicy relativizing or denying the truth content of at least one of the premises or the observation sentence (B) (denying the content), or denying that (K) emerges from the premises or contradicts (B) (formal attempt to nullify ).

An example of the latter is the theodicy of human free will. It is the most popular in the current discussion and denies a contradiction between (K) and (B). It is argued as follows:

 (A1) There is suffering in the world because God gave us people a free will.
(A2) He did so because a world of free will is better than one without and because he has created the best possible of all worlds.
(A3) Freedom of will necessarily implies that their bearers can also choose actions that bring suffering to the world.
(C) Therefore, the reality of suffering (B) does not contradict the previous conclusion (K) that our world is the best of all possible worlds.

 The theodicy is hereby, to a certain extent, re-formulated into an anthropodic, that is to say, instead of God, man is asked for a justification in the face of earthly suffering. This theodicy is certainly one of the strongest, nevertheless the counterarguments are obvious:

(I) The assumption (A1) contains three further, implicit (false) assumptions. The first is that all the suffering of the world could be explained by human free will. Not all suffering is definitely the outcome of human will decisions, such as natural disasters, epidemics and natural deaths, all of which are sources of suffering that would still exist if all people were to act with their free will always and in the best possible way. This kind of "natural" suffering is independent of free human will decisions in the world, which is why I call it "inhumane suffering." There really should not be this kind of suffering if the argument of free will were true and God would actually only tolerate suffering where necessary because of our free will. Consequently, God must at least justify the existence of such suffering, making it clear that at least the theodicy question can not be completely clarified by the recourse to human free will.

(2) The second implicit misconception in (A1) is that world suffering should be real only because we can choose actions that put suffering in the world. Conversely, this would mean that, as an alternative to any cause of action caused by suffering, there must be at least one second that does not cause suffering. But that is not true. In many places, people are confronted with situations that are similar to those in the trolley problem [9] and in which they can only decide between suffering-causing actions. For example, even today, some Inuits only have the ability to kill and eat animals, causing suffering, or starving themselves, which also brings suffering to the world. The world is conceived here in such a way that even if the universe is completely determined and free will is only an illusion, it must enter into one of two possible cases and inevitably suffer ("eat or be eaten"). This kind of suffering, which results from a lack of alternatives, I will call "unrepentant suffering II". If someone is to blame for this suffering, then God, because He created the world to contain action situations that, no matter how we make a decision, cause suffering.

(3) A third assumption can still be found in (A1), which is at least contentious. It is the idea that man is indeed endowed with a free will. However, this is not empirically verified, probably it can never be that for reasons of principle, but sure it must be made ad-hoc, so that the free will argument in the first place works.

(4) The thesis of the freedom of the human will, however, is not only disputable in the philosophical discourse, but also explicitly within the framework of the Christian image of the world and of God in which this argument is made. For the following reasons:

(4a) According to (P1c), God is omniscient, therefore he also knows that I will perform the action X at the future time t. But if God can already know that I will perform X, then I will not be able to choose Y and therefore can not have free will. However, if I am free to choose between the options X and Y, then it is unclear what decision I will make and the omniscient God of Christianity will not exist. If we pursue this idea further, it becomes clear that the assumption (A1) must be rejected as self-contradictory, because at the same time it asserts the existence of the Christian (omniscient) God and of human free will.

(4b) In addition, elements inherent in the Christian worldview are at least gradually diminishing human free will. First, at the theological level: In sinful conduct, the Christian God threatens us with hell, a place of eternal suffering and pain. Our freedom to choose God's moral dictates in the face of the hell's threat is akin to a person holding a gun to his temple saying, "You can choose freely for or against a particular behavior, but if you choose to do so, bang I take you off! "And secondly on the earthly plane: God has created us humans with instincts, behavioral dispositions and impulses, which hinder us all in our free will-practice. Such cases are particularly perfidious: God creates people with pedophile and sadistic tendencies and then punishes them for expressing those sinful dispositions and constraints that he himself had previously created in them. So God wants people to want A and says in all his wickedness, but they should do B. In his omniscience, he must have known from the beginning where this will lead, and yet he has created people whom he knew to cause great suffering on earth and to endure indefinitely afterwards. All this is profoundly contrary to the idea of ​​an All-Good God (P4c).

(4c) Third and finally, the assumption that God does not want to intervene in human free will (and therefore there is suffering) also contradicts the biblical narratives according to which God chose wars, performed miracles, made people solidify into salt columns and killed children , If one wants to believe the Bible, God intervenes very well and sometimes extremely cruelly in the human free will.

(5) The assumption (A3) is also questionable - and it contradicts (P1b)! If God is almighty, then by definition he must also have the power to prevent earthly suffering without interfering in our free will. If he did not have that power, he obviously would not be capable of anything or not all-powerful. If (P1b) is true and God is omnipotent, then he must be able to create a world of human free will and suffering. If one additionally assumes that (P1a) is true, the God characterized by omnipotence and omnipotence would not only be able to potentially create such a world, but also do so with logical necessity! Consequently, the free will argument does not do justice to its self-claim of resolving the central contradiction between (C) and (B), or it creates a new contradiction between (P2b) and (A3).

(6) But let us ignore this contradiction from (5) for a moment and assume that God is in fact impossible to create a world in which there is free will and at the same time little or no suffering. In this case, either there can be no unbelievable heaven in which Christian people move in after their death, or they are all in heaven only machines free of will!

(7) Seventh, the content has to be questioned (A2). Is a world of free will and suffering actually better than one without the two? Utilitarianism, an influential moral-philosophical school, sees the highest goals of human action in the generation of happiness and in the prevention of suffering (negative utilitarianism). And not in the freedom of these actions. If we follow the utilitarian prioritization, even if God can not create a world with free will and at the same time without suffering, a world without free will, but with maximum happiness and minimum suffering, would be preferable to ours. It then raises the question of why God did not create us in favor of a vain world without free will.

4.2. The properties of God

Theodicy focuses on the contradiction between the characterization of God and the reality of suffering. At the same time, the empirically comprehensible nature of the world and the hypothetical characterization of God already speak independently of the existence of God. The hypothetical characterization of God speaks against its existence because, when you finish it, it leads to many contradictions:

(1) Omnipotence: Either, God can create a stone that is so heavy that he can not lift it himself, or he can not. In both cases he is not (actual) omnipotent.

(2) Omniscience: Either God is omniscient, that is, he knows that clearly X will happen in the future, or God is omnipotent, that is, he can prevent X from happening in the future and doing Y instead. But God can not be omniscient as well as omnipotent.

(3) Perfection: Either God knows what it feels like to sin, or he does not know it. In both possible cases, it seems inappropriate to call it perfect. If God does not know what it is like to sin, then he does not seem to be omniscient, and consequently not perfect. But if God knows what it is like to sin (to rape a child, for example), we would not call Him "perfect."

(4) Freedom: Even more intricate is the preceding problem (3), if one adds the attribute of unlimited freedom attributed to God. Perfect freedom means that God can always choose both good and evil. But that would mean that God, in freedom, and not necessarily good, must also have evil drives in him. For a being who knows no evil drives necessarily must act well by nature. But if God, in his unrestricted freedom, must know many evil drives without restriction, how could we call him perfect? It can even be put on the point: If the opposite is the case and God can not help but choose the good, then he can not be perfect either, since a being who resists the temptation of evil drives and is free for deciding the good, usually considered more perfect than one that acts well, because it can not do otherwise. The quality of perfection thus presents us with a dilemma: if God necessarily acts well, then he is actually not very good, because he is powerless against these acts and does not have to overcome any evil drives. Besides, he could by no means be omnipotent (1). But if God is only contingent-good, it is at least as problematic to call him perfect, because then there must be evil drives in him. Moreover, this case is not compatible with the goodness of God: although God is called perfect, this perfect attribute does not seem to apply to him, unless he can do otherwise than act well, and therefore is not omnipotent, nor if he does also has evil drives, and thus certainly can not be all-good. The properties of perfection, omnipotence and generosity contradict one another in many ways.

4.3. The characteristics of the world

Another strong argument against the existence of God lies in the fact that the world is just like that and that the world structure is exactly what it would be if one assumes that God does not exist. For this only a small example should be mentioned: Prayers have no empirical effect. If Christians worshiped a stone instead of God, their prayers would be "heard" as often as they prayed to their God. In addition, only such prayers supposedly come true for which no supernatural intervention is required and for which there are also natural explanations. However, if God did exist then it would be likely that prayers will at least go beyond expectation, even if they require supernatural intervention.

5. Conclusion

We have seen that belief in God is not only non-rational (there are no rational reasons for it), but even irrational (there are rational reasons against him). But why do so many people still cling to a belief in God? Well, that's mostly because of non-rational reasons, such as the fear of its own transience, existential crises, or the desire for meaning and meaning. At this point, we must realize what "faith" means in this sense: accepting beliefs without rational justification. Seen in this way, faith is the exact counterpart to knowledge, that is, rationally justified conjecture. He, the religious faith, is then also intellectually dishonest, because he has a strong conviction, usually at least as strong as that of real knowledge, in the absence of rational justification. Broken down to a common denominator means the belief in God understood in this way, one pretends to know something that one does not know. This - the core of religious belief - seems self-deceptive to me.